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Abstract. In unstructured peer-to-peer networks, as in real life, a good neigh-
bourhood is not only crucial for a peaceful sleep, but also for an exchange of
important gossips and for ﬁnding good service.
This work investigates self-protection mechanisms based on reputation in un-
structured peer-to-peer networks. We use a simple approach where each peer
rates the service provided by others and exchanges the collected knowledge with
its direct neighbours. Based on reputation values peers manage their connections
to direct neighbours and make service provisioning decisions.
To quantify the impact of our proposed scheme, we implement a simple protocol
in a fully unstructured peer-to-peer network. We show that free riding and the im-
pact of malicious peers trying to poison the network with bad ﬁles is minimised.
Furthermore, we show that a good neighbourhood protects peers from selecting
bad ﬁles, while free riders suffer in a bad neighbourhood of malicious peers.
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1 Motivation
Network poisoning is a problem where malicious peers try to upload invalid ﬁles into
a peer-to-peer network. Although standard cryptographic solutions like hash functions
can helpus to checkthe integrityof ﬁles, theimpact of networkpoisoninghas increased
dramatically in the last few years. The reason is that in a decentralised, large-scale net-
workwherecontentis providedbytheusersthemselves,onecannoteasily transfertech-
niques from centralised content delivery environments. Many peer-to-peer networks
have lost their popularity because the content provided within those networks is mostly
malicious (infected by virus) or invalid, wasting the users’ time and bandwidth. On
the other hand, there is an increasing number of decentralized systems using reputation
schemes as security measure to protect users and reward cooperative behaviour.
Recently, various research contributions studied the impact and strategies of net-
work poisoning and analyzed its magnitude within P2P networks [14,5]. In this work,
we analyse the concept of self-protection against network poisoning and free riding
within unstructured peer-to-peer networks by using concepts from soft-security andtraditional security. We model our peer-to-peer network as a basic Gnutella network
[12] without any structure and extend it only by a simple protocol we call Simple Trust
ExchangeProtocol (STEP), which enables peers to decide whom to connect to as direct
neighbours and to whom to provide service. As the result, a trust-based construction of
an overlay network is accomplished by local decisions.
Toavoidtheextremecaseofindividual“learning-by-doing”STEPprovidesamech-
anism to exchange knowledge between its direct neighbours, which helps a neighbour-
hood to avoid selecting bad service or potentially malicious neighbours. Moreover, as
the search in unstructured networks is mostly based on different ﬂooding algorithms,
having a good neighbourhoodbecomes essential for a peer’s own search success.
Although scaling problems of the original Gnutella network are well-known, we
take advantageof a fully unstructurednetwork to avoid “deus ex machina” intervention
and to support the evolutionary growth of topology. Furthermore, the concept intro-
duced in this work does not depend on the ﬂooding approach of Gnutella and could be
adapted to different routing mechanisms (e.g. Ultrapeers).
2 Simple Trust Exchange Protocol (STEP)
To support service rating and exchange of knowledge among neighbouring peers, we
introduceSimpleTrustExchangeProtocol(STEP),thepseudo-anonymoustoken-based
protocol. A token is a mutually signed transaction receipt which serves as a proof of
service provision between a consumer and a provider (in all our scenarios we consider
a service to be a ﬁle transfer between a provider and a consumer, but clearly, other
scenarios are also conceivable). To participate in the system, every peer needs to create
a public-private key-pair as its identity. Because the identity has no ties to the outside
world and only becomes meaningful by a token signed with it, there is no need for any
public key infrastructure.
To discourage the change of identity, in this work we follow the idea of "no proﬁt
to newcomers" [13], where every new peer gets the minimal possible reputation.
STEP relies on a peer-to-peernetwork to discover and deliver services and only ex-
tends systems by a token creation mechanism and knowledge exchange between peers.
The structure of a token is shown in Table 1.
Name Description
CID Consumer’s identity
PID Provider’s identity
TS Timestamp of token creation
Length Length/Duration of service (e.g. File size)
Rating Consumer’s rating ({good,bad})
CSig Consumer’s Signature
PSig Provider’s Signature
Table 1. Token structure2.1 Token creation
A token is created upon a request of a service and is supplemented with rating after a
transaction has ﬁnished. Upon the service request a consumer creates an initial token
by ﬁlling the data ﬁelds except Rating and signs it with his private key. The consumer
sends the token and his public key to a provider. If the provider accepts the service
request he also signs the initial token and sends the token and his public key back to
the consumer. After the transaction the consumer rates the provider (ﬁlling the Rating
ﬁeld) and ﬁnalizes the token by re-signing it. Finally, he sends a copy of the token to
the provider.
The objective behind the consumer’s double signing is to mitigate the incentives for
not ﬁnalizing the token. For example, a free-ridercould decide to reject ﬁnalization and
publication of the token to avoid being detected as a consumer. In this case the initial
token containing the free-rider’s signature will be published by a provider. As a result,
other peers will be able to collect tokens and if the provider is trusted the free-rider can
still be detected.
2.2 Knowledge Exchange
Every peer can improve its own knowledge over another peer directly by requesting a
service and then rating it, or indirectly by collecting other ratings about that peer and
then using them to compute its own trust value.
Knowledgeexchangebetweenpeersis realizedthroughdistributionoftokenswithin
an overlay network and by storing the received tokens locally. We use the Gnutella-
typical ﬂooding approach for distributing tokens in a way similar to query for services.
The Knowledge message is wrapped in Gnutella Query messages to provide max-
imum compatibility with legacy peers in mixed networks, analogous to the approach
described in [8]. To enable the veriﬁcation of a token, in case the local neighbours do
not have the requiredkeys,a peer forwardingthe token appendsthe missing public keys
of both, the consumer and provider, to the Knowledge message.
2.3 Decision Making
The computation of a peer’s reputation is a subjective matter and every peer can choose
its ownmethodforinterpretingthecollectedtokens.Inthisworkwe focusontheimpact
of reputation and not on its calculation, which is why we use a simple approach of
calculating the number of collected tokens where the provider was rated as good, and
subtracting the tokens where the rating was bad. Although this mechanism does not
deal with nodes that are actively trying to cheat the reputation system (such as attacks
from malicious groupof peers which can mutually sign tokens),STEP provides enough
room for implementation of more sophisticated algorithms. For example, one peer can
choose to follow the PGP’s “Web-of-Trust” concept by considering the trustworthiness
of both signatures, as well as by utilizing the transitivity of trust relationships (e.g. [4])
or more accurately computing reputation of token-based systems with a more complex
attacker model (e.g. [10]). Furthermore, a very restrictive approach would be to base
the trust computation only on a closed group od peers (similar concepts already existas “darknets” which represent a closed group of members within a public peer-to-peer
network).
Search and Service Selection. After executing a Gnutella query and receiving search
results a peer can immediately compute a reputation of available provider peers based
on its local knowledge. The consumer peer then selects a ﬁle with a probability propor-
tional to the sum of reputations of all providers offering the same ﬁle [13].
Due to assigning a reputation with positive minimum to every peer, every provider
has the chance of being selected. This method decreases the overloading of a few top
providers and increases the chance of selecting a newly joined peer if it provides fre-
quently searched ﬁles.
Service Providing. After selecting a provider, a consumer sends a service request. If
there is enough free bandwidth for an upload connection, the provider grants the ser-
vice immediately to maximize the utilization of its bandwidth. Otherwise the provider
computes a reputation of the new consumer and compares it with the lowest reputa-
tion of those consumers already connected. If the reputation of the new consumer is
higher than that of any already connected consumers, the connection with the lowest
value is cancelled and replaced with a new one. Although it would be better to use a
non-preemptive queue to ﬁnish the already started ﬁle transfer instead of cancelling a
transaction in progress, Gnutella does not support such concept.
Choosing the Neighbourhood. In Gnutella, every peer has a minimum number of
desired neighbours(typically 4 for real-world Gnutella networks). If its current number
of neighbours is less then desired the peer actively tries to connect to more neighbours.
Instead of choosing the neighbours arbitrarily as in the classic Gnutella a STEP peer
tries to connectto neighbourswith a reputationat least as highas its currentneighbours.
If no such peers are available an arbitrary peer is chosen.
Most of the peers, depending on their bandwidth, support more than the minimum
number of neighboursand thus are able to accept incomingconnection requests by new
peers. In the classic Gnutella every peer with available connection slots accepts all in-
coming connection requests. In STEP only requesting peers with a reputation that is
in average not lower than those of the current neighbours, are accepted. If the STEP
peer has reached the maximum number of Gnutella connections, then, for every fur-
ther connection request the reputation of a requesting peer is compared with the local
neighbourhood. If a neighbour with a lower reputation is already connected, it will be
replaced.
3 Experiments
Service mentioned in all of our scenarios is a ﬁle transfer and we have modelled 4
different peer proﬁles:
– Cooperative Peer: a peer that offers services to the network by sharing valid ﬁles,– Freerider: an opportunistic peer that does not share any ﬁles but only requests ser-
vices,
– Foul Dealer: a malicious peerwith a high bandwidthand maximumnumberof ﬁles
(highest probability to answer with QueryReply), which tries to upload invalid
ﬁles only (network poisoning),
– Good Dealer: opposite of the Foul Dealer, an altruistic peer with a high bandwidth
and a large number of valid ﬁles.
The proﬁle of a Good Dealer is only for measurement purposes in order to better com-
pare the impact of good and bad dealers within a STEP-enhanced and legacy Gnutella
network.
3.1 Conﬁguration
One of the advantages of using Gnutella for our investigation is the availability of rich
empirical data. To providerealistic assumptions of the peers’ online times and available
bandwidths, we have used empirical distributions based on the Gnutella analysis from
[16]. The ﬁle popularity distribution was also based on empirical data taken from [17]
which analysed the Kazaa peer-to-peer network. Other simulation parameters are listed
in Table 2.
Network Size 2048, 4096
Number of Files 192.000
Token Validity Time 10 h
Query Interval 2-4 min
Simulation Time 80 hours
Table 2. Simulation Parameters
The number of Free Riders was set to 50% for both network sizes and number of
Foul Dealers and Good Dealers was set to 64. The bandwidth was divided into upload-
and download streams which can be asymmetric to conform to a real peer-to-peer net-
work with heterogeneous peers (e.g. DSL users with 1024 Kbit/s downstream and 128
Kbit/s upstream). The minimum bandwidth represent modem users with both upstream
and downstream of 32 KBit/s and the maximum bandwidth is a broadband user hav-
ing 10 MBit/s for both directions. Both, Foul Dealer and Good Dealers are assumed to
have maximum bandwidth, where other peers follow empirical distributions from the
real-world statistics.
As the goal of this work was not to provide highly sophisticated mechanisms to
detect malicious behaviour we assume all peers conform to Gnutella and/or the STEP
protocol with the exception that every peer rated as bad will not publish tokens. The
service is rated as good if the ﬁle was sound and bad if not. Every peer makes a wrong
rating(unintentionally)with a probabilityof 5%. Inthe initialization phase,whena new
peer joins the network it randomly tries to connect to peers from a global peer cache.Because of a long transient phase of network initialization, we simulated 80 hours of
network activity. This proved to be very important as the steady state was reached after
approximately 15 hours. All simulations were conducted on an Athlon XP 2500+ with
1 GB RAM and one simulation run took approximately24 hours to ﬁnish. The memory
requirements of the simulation were 889 MB.
3.2 Results
Network Poisoning. In Figure 1 we analyse the impact of Foul Dealers and Good
Dealers on network poisoning by comparing the number of successful uploads of bad
ﬁles within both scenarios.As it can be seen, in the STEP-enhancedscenario the impact
of Foul Dealers is decreased by 77% while the impact of Good Dealers is increased by
46%.
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Fig.1. Network Poisoning
Figure 2 analyses the downloads between cooperative peers and free-riders, again
forthetwo scenarios.Thetotalnumberofgooddownloads(cooperativeandfree-riders)
remains almost equal in both networks, but the number of good downloads of cooper-
ative peers is almost 20% higher than for free riders. In a legacy network there is no
incentive to behave cooperatively since all peers equally download good and bad ﬁles.
Evenmoreinterestingis the factthatthereis only13%baddownloadswithinthe STEP-
enhanced network out of which 83% are performed by free-riders.
Furthermore, we measured the number of good and bad query results (a bad result
is service offered by a foul dealer) for both cooperative and free-rider peers when they
search for a speciﬁc ﬁle. As previously mentioned, the search in the Gnutella peer-to-
peer network is a simple ﬂooding. Due to the limitation of ﬂooding by a query’s TTL
counter, it is important for a peer to be in a good neighbourhood. As it can be seen in
Figure 3, the number of bad results for cooperative peers decreases dramatically, while
the free-ridersare losing good results and gainingmore bad results. The overallnumber
of query results is decreased after 15 hours as a result of neighbourhoodclustering.0
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Fig.3. Search results
Knowledge. Figure 4 (left) shows local knowledge of a peer over all tokens in the
network. As it can be seen, after 15 hours the local knowledge covers over 40% of all
tokens existing in the network. The reason for its decrease after the ﬁrst 15 hours is
the clustering of the network, when the good neighbourhood has been established and
tokens from the bad neighbourhood cannot reach most of the peers within the good
neighbourhood. The Figure 4 (right) shows the accuracy of a peer’s local knowledge
about everyother peer. As a result, althoughevery peer knows only40% of all tokens in
the network it has on average 50% of all tokens associated to the peer when calculating
its reputation. This is due to the limited horizon of query and knowledge exchange
messages,bothaffectedbythelocationofa peerintheoverlaynetworkinthesameway.
Thus, the receivedtokens will be more related to providers’and consumers’reputations
actually calculated than tokens beyond the horizon, which never reached the peer.
Topology. Figure 5 shows topologies captured during the simulation times of 10h,
20h, 30h and 40h. After 40h the topology has stabilised and no signiﬁcant changes
occured afterwards. A clear separation of neighbourhoodscan be seen after 25 hours of0%
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Fig.4. Local knowledge
simulation where cooperative peers have distanced themselves from most of the Foul
Dealers creating a neighbourhoodwith the Free Riders.
There are still many connections between the neighbourhoods, but due to the TTL
scoping of Query and Knowledge messages most message exchanges remain inside
neighbourhoods, resulting in decreased number of query results from remote neigh-
bourhoods. This also results in a decreased number of queries sent from free-riders to
good peers (and thus self-protecting) but also from other good neighbourhoods.
Fig.5. Topologies after 10h, 20h, 30h and 40hSTEPOverhead. TheOverheadofSTEPcanbemainlyattributed(98%)toKnowledge
messages as they contain tokens and public keys. In the worst case every token has 2
public keys and if the key length is set to 512 Bit every token costs 128 Bytes. Never-
theless we implemented a simple caching strategy where only new keys are forwarded
to direct neighbours decreasing the cost to only 0.6 keys per token and still provide key
distribution within fully unstructured peer-to-peer network. Furthermore, the length of
an average knowledge message was 750 Bytes and maximally 1500 Bytes.
As the result, we can state that the price to pay for STEP is a 28% increase in
bandwidth usage over standard Gnutella control message overhead; yet, its advantage
is a dramatical decrease in the number of bad downloads and enhanced incentives for
cooperative peers as they are now able to increase the utilization of their bandwidth
with valid downloads which are preferred over those of the free-riders.
4 Related Work
The problems caused by selﬁsh and malicious participants in peer-to-peer and ad hoc
networks have been examined in several studies (e.g. [9,11,3,2]).
Probably the ﬁrst to propose a practical solution based on traditional cryptography
and structured overlay networks were Aberer and Despotovic [1] using the P-Grid sys-
tem to store and retrieve complaints about misbehaving peers. The principle of “no
proﬁt to newcomers” together with other design goals for peer-to-peer networks (self-
policing, anonymity, no proﬁt to newcomers, minimal overhead, robust to malicious
collectives) has been described by Kamvar et al [13]. They created the EigenTrust peer-
to-peerreputationsystem accordingto those design goals. EigenTrustuses a distributed
way of approximating the global trust value of a peer. Damiani et al [8] proposed a dis-
tributed reputation system as an extension to Gnutella called P2PRep, with a seamless
migration path for existing Gnutella networks. Those integration concepts can be ap-
plied to our system in a similar fashion. Instead of using signed transaction receipts
they rely on a live poll of user opinions, which has its own advantages and disadvan-
tages.The usageofreputationas a trustbuildingconceptwithina decentralisednetwork
of WLAN providers was described by Efstathiou and Polyzos in [10]. They apply the
concept of a token-based reputation to a system they call a Peer-to-Peer Wireless Net-
work Confederation (P2PWNC). For reputation calculation they use a maximum ﬂow
based algorithm called NWAY which is very resilient to cooperating groups of mali-
cious nodes. The tokens in their system are exchangedby interacting parties, instead of
the active publication mechanism we use.
Veryinterestingworkonusingtrusttobuildanunstructuredoverlaynetwork(Adap-
tiveP2P Topologies)was introducedbyCondieet al.[6].Insteadofareputationsystem,
they count only the subjective experience of every node itself. This minimizes the over-
head of the protocol but also limits the available information on other peers. As the
result of their adaptive topologies, the malicious peers and free-riders are pushed to the
fringeof the network,which is similar to ourwork.However,the major differenceis the
usage oftokens to avoid distributionof onlysubjectivereports(gossips).We considered
the token mechanism to provide further advantages such as, choosing indivdual repu-
tation algorithms and support of the Web-of-Trust concept in a peer-to-peer networkwhere every peer can individually decide whose tokens can be more trusted based on
the providers and consumers signatures.
Furthermore, tokens constitute the basis for coordination and control mechanisms
as well as for pricing in commercial scenarios as described by Liebau et al. [15].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presents our initial work on trust in unstructured peer-to-peer networks.
Our objective is to investigate into more depth both, the impact and efﬁciency of self-
protectingmechanismsbasedon trustcomputation.We havechosentouse a completely
unstructured peer-to-peer network as it allows us to investigate impacts on topology, as
well as to support evolutionary growth of the network.
STEP deﬁnes a simple way to create transaction receipts and is adaptable to many
different methods for knowledge exchange. The algorithm presented here adapts the
Gnutella query method for maximum compatibility with legacy networks.
The Gnutella network is clearly not very scalable but many alternative routing
mechanisms for message routing in peer-to-peer networks have been proposed in re-
cent years. Alternatively, tokens can be accumulated at each intermediate peer and for-
warded in regular intervals to reduce the number of messages needed. Also, as a part
of our future work we intend to investigate how trust can be used for a better routing
of search messages to mitigated overloading of trusted peers and to create incentives
against free-riding. The idea of trust-based routing could help us to scale the efﬁciency
of routing scheme based on trustworthiness of a peer or a neighbourhood.
Furthermore, if the service provided by the peers is the upload of shared content,
the semantics of this content may also be used to achieve better routing of tokens,
which leads to a more precise reputation calculation and consequently to a better reor-
ganization of the overlay. It has been observed that content is normally clustered into
categories with most peers being active only in very few categories [7]. Therefore, the
interaction topology of such content distribution networks are typically highly clus-
tered. This circumstance may be used to distribute tokens to peers which can make use
of them more efﬁciently.
TheSTEPsystemis notonlyhighlyindependentoftheknowledgeexchangemethod
but also of the choice of reputation algorithms such that every peer can choose an al-
gorithm independently. The choice of usable algorithms is very broad as every node
can store a relevant proportion of the globally available knowledge about rated peers.
To optimize the overall system performance the chosen algorithm should not only be
resilient against attacks, but shouldalso providegoodresults evenwith little aggregated
data. To follow this idea, we consider not only token mechanisms, but also concepts of
accumulated gossiping for building trust within peer-to-peer networks.References
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